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TIE-IN STATUTES AND PARITY REGULATIONS
AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FIRST OF THE STUDENT articles on savings associations will examine
various types of tie-in statutes and parity regulations which states
have enacted to give their local savings associations the same powers as
their federal counterparts. A framework for predicting the constitutional
integrity of such statutes and regulations will then be established by reviewing
United States Supreme Court analyses of federal statutes which, much like
state parity statutes, delegate legislative power to administrative agencies. By
using Ohio case law on delegation of authority, Ohio's statute which grants
rule-making power to the Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations
will then be analyzed as to its probable constitutionality. Finally, each type
of tie-in statute and parity regulation will be viewed again to evaluate the
due process safeguards provided in delegating authority.
A. The Need for Parity
Tie-in statutes and parity regulations in the savings and loan area
are legislative and administrative devices designed to give state savings
associations the same or similar powers possessed by federal savings
associations. The reason for having parity between the state and federal
savings associations is simple: competition. If federal associations are given
expanded powers which enable them to offer more and better services or
higher interest rates, then state savings associations will naturally be at a
disadvantage in the thrift business. But there is a lack of parity because
of the broad powers given by Congress to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB). With regulatory control over all federal savings associa-
tions' the FHLBB is not bound to conform to state laws in promulgating
its regulations
Before the advent of tie-in legislation, states had made several attempts
either to eradicate or limit the powers of federal savings associations operating
within their jurisdictions. Perhaps the most straightforward attack on federal
savings associations was made in First Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. Loomis,' in which Wisconsin attempted to have legislation authorizing the
I Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5 (a), 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (a) (1970).
2 See cases cited at note 8 infra.
3 97 F.2d 831 (7th Cir.), constitutional question certified to the Attorney General, 305 U.S.
562, cert. granted, 305 U.S. 564 (1938), cert. dismissed on motion of petitioner, 305 U.S.
666 (1939).
Loomis was not Wisconsin's first attack on these federal associations. In Hopkins Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935), the state tested the constitutionality of
section 5 (i) of the Home Owners' Loan Act. This section, which permitted state savings
associations to convert to federal associations in spite of any contrary state law, was held
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formation of federal savings associations declared unconstitutional. Wisconsin
argued that Congress had invaded the powers reserved to the states in
violation of the tenth amendment when it allowed for the formation of
federal savings associations.' The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
Wisconsin's argument and found the statute constitutional. The decision
was premised on the congressional power to create fiscal agents and to
provide for the general welfare of the United States.' The current view is
that federal thrift institutions are legitimately regulated by Congress under
the commerce clause. 6
California used a direct approach in its fight to protect its local savings
associations from federally chartered associations. California attempted
to apply the state laws which controlled the local thrift industry to federal
associations operating within the state. Under the doctrine of preemption,
the district court in California v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Association'
held that Congress had embraced the entire field with its legislation in
the area; thus state regulatory statutes were invalid as applied to federal
associations. Several states have attempted the same direct control of
federal associations, but these attempts have been uniformly rejected.'
The final noteworthy attempt to obtain equality was made by several
Illinois financial institutions, including state chartered savings associations
and banks, as well as a nationally chartered bank, all of whom brought
actions to force federal conformity with local branching laws in Lyons
to be void under the tenth amendment as an infringement upon the powers reserved to the
states. Id. at 336.
Prior to Loomis, the Attorney General had declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
Home Owners' Loan Act. 39 Op. Arr'y GEN. 11 (1937).
4 As in Hopkins, the constitutional basis of Wisconsin's claim was that the formation of
federal savings associations was unconstitutional under the tenth amendment. 97 F.2d at
844 (Sparks, J., dissenting).
5 U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. The Court cited Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,
255 U.S. 180 (1921), which held congressional formation of Federal Land Banks and
Joint Stockland Banks to be constitutional.
For further support of the Loomis decision, in that the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 is
based on congressional power to tax and make appropriations for the general welfare, see
Mamber v. Second Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 275 F. Supp. 170 (D. Mass. 1967). See generally
Annot., 121 A.L.R. 117 (1939), supplemented by Annot., 125 A.L.R. 809 (1940).
6 See, e.g., Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 1967);
Gibson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560, 564 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
798 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
a Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974); Rettig
v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Elwert v.
Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1956); Larwood Co. v.
San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 185 Cal. App. 2d 450, 8 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1960). Cf.
City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 654-655 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(applying federal common law to the fiducial duties of officers and directors); Beverly Hills
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 371 F. Supp. 306, 314 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (federal
common law applies in the absence of specific federal regulations).
[Vol. i1: A
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Savings & Loan Association v. FHLBB.0 The local associations in Lyons
attacked a FHLBB decision which permitted federal associations to establish
branches in Illinois," although local associations were not permitted to
branch under state law." This suit was premised, in part, on equal protection
and due process grounds. The district court was unable to find a basis for
an equal protection claim, pointing to the fact that the two types of savings
associations were under the control of two different regulatory agencies.
The court stated that
state banks and state savings and loan associations may not complain
of a competitive advantage accorded federal savings and loan associa-
tions by a separate and distinct regulatory body. State associations are
free either to press their legislature into according them a comparable
right, or to become federal associations. 2
The court held that the local savings associations had sufficient input into
the FHLBB's decision-making process and thus due process was not denied.'
The failure of these attempts to force federal conformity with local
laws controlling the thrift industry resulted in state associations being placed
at the mercy of federal statutory law and FHLBB regulation. The only
alternative left for state chartered associations was to seek legislative
changes; they could either ask Congress to limit the powers of federal
associations or pressure the local legislatures to increase their own. The
more logical and perhaps the easiest alternative was to seek legislative
reform at the local level. This resulted in the various tie-in statutes and
parity regulatory powers given to local administrative agencies.
B. Jurisdiction of the FHLBB
An examination of state statutes" will reveal that local savings
associations are given the power to become members of their regional
federal home loan bank." In exercising this power, the state associations
9377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. 111. 1974). An excellent discussion of this case is contained in
Federal Savings and Loan Law, 51 CI. - KENT L. Rav. 656 (1975).
10 377 F. Supp. at 14.
11 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 709 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
16 1/2, § 106 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
12 377 F. Supp. at 20. The court based its opinion on Abilene National Bank v. Dolley,
228 U.S. 1 (1913), which rejected a similar competitive disadvantage argument made by a
national bank with reference to state bank power.
The court also rejected an equal protection claim by national banks. The different treat-
ment was found justified since the two entities are different types of institutions. 377 F. Supp.
at 20-21.
13 377 F. Supp. at 19-20.
4See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1151.35 (A) (Page Cum. Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 51A.21 (8) (West 1970).
15 Membership is offered to local savings associations under the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act of 1932, § 24, 12 U.S.C. § 1444 (1970).
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subject themselves to the rules and regulations of the FHLBB 1' and become
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. (Only federal savings
associations are members of the Federal Savings and Loan System.) The
FHLBB has authority to promulgate rules and regulations to control
Federal Home Loan Bank members" as well as authority to regulate all
federal savings associations.18 The regulations promulgated under these two
different statutory grants of power are mutually exclusive, 9 in that members
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System are not subject to the regulations
covering the Federal Savings and Loan System."0
The FHLBB regulations that apply to members of the Federal Home
Loan Bank System and thus to state chartered association members, are
not detailed and normally do not infringe on state law. The various regulations
involve liquidity, reporting, examination, flood insurance on mortgaged
properties, and nondiscrimination.2' By comparing these regulations with
those of the Federal Savings and Loan System, which provide in detail the
power exercisable by the federal associations, 2 one can easily see why
parity regulations and tie-in statutes are necessary.
II. THE PARITY SCHEME IN THE STATES
Only eight states have chosen not to use tie-in statutes or parity
regulations to make their local savings associations competitive with federal
savings associations. 3 The remaining forty-two states have tied into federal
law. Statutes that have accomplished this federal-state parity have done so
in a variety of ways. The purpose of this section will be to classify, as far
as possible, this assortment of statutes and to indicate some common
characteristics. With this goal in mind, the statutes have been placed into
five major categories. These will be denominated (1) completely automatic
statutes, (2) automatic with post limitation statutes, (3) prior consent
16 Id. § 1444 (b).
17 Id. § 1437 (a), 1444 (b).
is Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5 (a), 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (a) (1970).
19 Compare 12 C.F.R. §§ 521-532 (1977) (regulations for the Federal Home Loan Bank
System) with 12 C.F.R. §§ 541-556 (1977) (regulations for the Federal Savings and Loan
System).
20 The opposite is not true. Federal savings associations are required to be members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System; thus they are subject to Federal Home Loan Bank
regulations. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5 (f), 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (f) (1970).
21 12 C.F.R. §§ 523.11, 523.15, 523.20, 523.29, and 528.2-528.7 (1977).
22 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6, 545.8-3 (1977), which provide in detail the types of loans
which federal savings associations may make.
23Alaska, Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and
Vermont have not adopted any tie-in statutes. It should be noted that many states have
passed tie-in legislation within the last two years. For this reason, current legislation should
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statutes, (4) one-at-a-time statutes, and (5) miscellaneous statutes. In
addition, it should be noted that there are nine states2" with more than one
statute, each covering a different grant of federal power. Because the
individual statutes of these states will still be placed in the above classifica-
tions, a state may appear in more than one category.
A. Classification of the Statutes
The completely automatic statute is a direct legislative grant of
federal power to state savings associations. The powers given under this
type of statute are automatically conferred upon the local associations,
i.e., the powers are given without the approval of and many times in spite
of the state regulatory agency which controls the local savings association.
The majority of these statutes are only partial tie-in statutes, in that local
associations are given only the select powers expressly designated by the
statute. For example, Washington has two completely automatic statutes.
The first grants the local savings associations the same investment powers
as federal savings associations.25 The second gives the local association the
ability to make the same realty-secured loans as can be made by federal
associations.2" There are nine other states which have this partial grant
of power given through the use of the completely automatic statute.27
24 North Carolina, Minnesota, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, West Virginia, Nevada, Colorado, and
Texas have at least two tie-in statutes, each providing for a different method of tie-in
relative to the area covered by the individual statute.
25 WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 33.24.190 (1961). This section states: "Notwithstanding any
provision of this title, an association may invest its funds in any loan or purchase which
is permitted to a federal savings and loan association doing business in this state."
2e WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 33.24.100 (Supp. 1976). This section states in pertinent part:
An association may invest its funds in loans secured by first mortgages in improved
real estate, subject to the following conditions and restrictions: ....
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, an association may make any loan
which is permitted to a federal savings and loan association doing business in this
state.
Like many statutes in this area, subsection 33.24.100 (4) is difficult to interpret. A
literal reading of the subsection would give the state association the same lending powers
as federal associations. However, the subsection is a part of the section concerning real estate
mortgage loans only. For this reason, the author is forced to assume that state associations
in Washington are given only the same lending powers as federal associations in the real
estate lending area, to be sure a more expansive interpretation is possible.
27 ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 16-52 (1975) (granting federal loan, investment and contract powers
to state savings association); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 11-41-112(e), 11-14-114(1)(i), 11-41-119
(4) (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976) (giving through tie-in legislation the powers for local
associations to act as trustees for pension plans, to invest in corporate stock, and to make
the same loans that federal associations can make); IDAHO CODE § 26-1934 (1977) (auto-
matic grant of federal loan and investment powers); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 9-B., §§ 722(3),
732(10) (Pamphlet 1977) (allowing the same type of savings accounts and deposits, and removal
of restrictions on loan size limitations); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.02 (21) (Cum. Supp.
1978) (allowing service organizations of local savings associations to exercise the same
powers as federal service organizations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-33.3(5) (Cum. Supp.
1977) (giving state service corporations the same powers with respect to their data process-
ing activities as enjoyed by federal service corporations as of July 1, 1977; additional
P ROJECT
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A more comprehensive use of the completely automatic statute is
found in three states which use this type of statute to give their state savings
associations all powers possessed by federal associations. Arizona grants to
its insured savings associations all powers granted to federal associations
doing business within the state, subject only to limitations of state law.28
Nevada"9 and Iowa"° have this same type of statute. The total incorporation of
federal law through the use of a completely automatic statute in essence
results in turning the state savings associations into federal associations.
The second grouping, automatic statutes with post limitations, is really
only a variation of the first group. These statutes automatically confer
federal powers upon state savings associations, but with one additional
feature. Any powers given in this manner are expressly subject to any
subsequent regulations promulgated by the state agency controlling the
savings association industry. Normally this after-the-fact power enables the
agency either to modify or to remove completely the power granted by the
tie-in statute. An example of this type of legislation is the Wyoming statute
which provides:
(b) Guaranty capital savings and loan associations shall have all
powers authorized by the federal home loan bank for federal savings
powers must be approved by the corresponding regulatory agency); N.D. CENT. CODE §
7-02-14 (1975) (loan and investment powers); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, §
5.04, 5.16, 6.20 (1964 & Cum. Supp. 1978) (loan and investment powers and power to
raise capital); W. VA. CODE §H 31-6-42, 31-6-43 (1975) (loan and investment powers and
the same powers in the issuance of savings accounts).
28Aiz. REv. STAT. § 6-402B (1974).
29 NEv. REV. STAT. § 673.225 (1) (1977).
Subsection two of this section goes on to provide:
When more permissive lending and investment privileges and provisions regarding
payment of interest to savers or savings account holders, establishment of savings
accounts, the acceptance of which has been approved by the Nevada Supervisory
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or other powers, privileges,
immunities and exceptions are extended to federally chartered associations, the same
shall be extended to every federally insured association or corpoiation licensed under
the provisions of this chapter.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 673.225 (2) (1977).
This second subsection conflicts with the first subsection, in that it restricts the kinds
of powers given to state associations in the first subsection. Perhaps the most logical inter-
pretation of the two subsections is to read the second subsection as an exception to or a
limitation on the first subsection.
30 IOWA CODE ANN. § 534.31 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
Note that the Iowa Code also contains another tie-in statute. IowA CODE ANN. §
534.19 (18) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). This latter statute allows a state association to
operate under the federal regulations as to deposits and interest and to exercise other "such
powers" granted to federal associations as long as similar rules and regulations have been
adopted by the supervisor of savings and loan associations. This section goes on to provide
specifically that it is not meant to restrict the powers already granted to the state associ-
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and loan associations including authority to lend eighty percent (80%)
of the value of improved real estate upon which secured loans shall
be made as security provided that the state examiner by rule or
regulation may restrict or limit such authority in the manner and to
the extent he deems necessary."
Illinois," Utah,"' Pennsylvania,"4 and Tennessee"5 have statutes similar to
Wyoming's in that these states also grant local associations all the federal
powers" subject to the local agency regulation. In addition, this type of
statute is being used to tie into specific federal powers, such as loan and
investment powers.
The prior consent statute is unique in that it requires an association
to ask permission of the state regulatory authority to engage in activities
permitted by the FHLBB for federal savings associations. The Hawaii
statute, for example, provides that any insured state chartered institution
that is a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank System "shall have, with
the prior consent of the bank examiner, all rights, privileges, benefits and
immunities" possessed by local federal institutions." The wording of the
Hawaii statute seems to contemplate that each savings association will ask
permission to exercise a power already granted to the federal associations
and that permission will be granted or denied on a case-by-case basis.
South Dakota also uses this type of statute to tie into federal savings
associations' loan and investment powers. 9
S1 WYo. STAT. § 13-7-102 (b) (Interim Supp. 1977).
3
2 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 706 (c) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978).
33 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-13-74 (1953).
$, Public Act No. 1977-33, § 1, 1977 Pa. Legis. Serv. 138 (Purdon) (to be codified as PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 7, § 6020-10 (a) (22) (Purdon)).
3 5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-1409 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
36 Note that the Pennsylvania tie-in statute is also limited by any other statutes which may
be in conflict with the Pennsylvania tie-in statute. Instead of the repealer as found in
most statutes, the Pennsylvania tie-in statute states that "[a]ssociations shall have all
powers granted to Federal savings and loan associations except as limited or prohibited by
this act." Public Act No. 1977-33, § 1, 1977 Pa. Legis. Serv. 138 (Purdon) (to be codified
as PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 7, § 6020-101 (a) (22) (Purdon)) (emphasis added).
3'FCoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 11-41-114 (1) (j), 11-42-125 (7) (1973) (specified investment
powers and interest paid on deposits); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-21.2 (b) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(loan and investment powers).
ss HAW. REv. STAT. § 407-55 (1976).
39 S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § 52-8-24 (Supp. 1977). Other states with tie-in statutes
of this type are Minnesota and Colorado. See CoLo. Rv. STAT. §§ 11-41-114(1) (h), 11-41-114
(1) (i), 11-42-111 (14) (1973) (granting federal investment powers and granting the same
dividend rights as federal associations); MIKN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.53 (1970). A word of
caution about Colorado's tie-in statutes: the Colorado tie-in scheme is more fragmented
than any other state's. There are at least nine separate sections and subsections which tie
into federal law. In addition, § 11-41-114 (1) (i) is an extremely complex tie-in statute.
This section is a "completely automatic" statute, as far as investments in the
"capital stock, obligations, or other securities of any corporation." However, if a desired
Winter, 1978] PROJECT
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The fourth type of statute, the one-at-a-time, is the most common.
States choosing this type of statute have delegated the task of obtaining
parity to the state administrative agency which controls state savings
associations. This administrative agency promulgates parity regulations
which give state associations federal powers in a step-by-step manner. The
Ohio statute falls into this category and provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any provision in Chapters 1151., 1153., 1155., and
1157. of the Revised Code, if federal savings and loan associations
organized under the "Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933", 48 Stat. 128,
12 U.S.C. 1461, and amendments thereto, the home offices of which
are located in this state, shall possess a right, power, privilege, or
benefit by virtue of statute, rule, or regulation, or judicial decision
or will possess such right, power, privilege, or benefit by virtue of a
rule or regulation issued but not effective, which right, power, privilege,
or benefit is not possessed by a building and loan association organized
under the laws of this state, the superintendent of building and loan
associations may, by regulation, authorize building and loan associations
organized under the laws of this state to exercise such right, power,
privilege, or benefit."0
In addition to Ohio, twenty-five other states use this type of statute to tie
into federal laws.'
investment does not fit into this category, a Colorado savings association may request
the commissioner for permission to make the investment. The commissioner is in turn
allowed to permit other investments into business and other activities that have been
approved for federal associations by the FHLBB. This section is thus both a "completely auto-
matic" and a "prior consent" tie-in statute.
40Omo Rev. CODE ANN. § 1155.18 (Page 1968).
,"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1858 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (allowing the granting of concessions
or premiums on the opening of a savings account, allowing the same legal relationship be-
tween savings account holders and savings associations as under federal law, allowing the
same method of interest and dividend payment, allowing the use of the same business
practices and allowing the same investment and loan powers); CAL. FIN. CODE § 5500.5
(West Cum. Supp. 1978) (all powers); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 11-41-119 (4), 11-42-125 (2),
11-42-125 (8) (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976) (investment and savings account powers);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-178g (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (all powers); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 665.215 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (all powers) (Note that the Florida statute begins with
the words "[als regulated by the department." The author's interpretation is that it is
necessary for a departmental regulation to be issued before a tie-in power can be used by
a local association. An equally sound argument could be made, however, that the section
is a completely automatic statute which automatically grants the federal powers, but is
subject to department regulation, i.e., a prior consent statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 41A-302
(1974) (all powers); IDAHO CODE § 26-1934 (1977) (all powers, except for loan and invest-
ment powers which are automatically granted); IOWA CODE ANN. § 534.19 (18) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-78) (federal rules as to deposits and interest); KAN. STAT. § 17-5601
(Cum. Supp. 1977) (all powers); KY. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 289.705 (Baldwin 1971) (same
powers as to loans, savings accounts, deposits, and dividend and interest payments); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 6:902 (B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (all powers); ME. REv. STAT.
tit. 9-B., § 416 (Pamphlet 1977) (all powers); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 161Z (Cum. Supp.
1977) (investment powers); Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-12-49 (r) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (all
powers); Mo, ANN, ST4T, § 369.299 (2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978) (all powers); MONT.
[Vol. 11:3
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The difference between the one-at-a-time statute and the completely
automatic statute may be illusory. Under a one-at-a-time statute, the agency
controlling savings associations in a state could easily adopt a regulation
that would result in the state associations being automatically granted
federal powers. In New Jersey, this is essentially what was done. The
statute in New Jersey permits the Commissioner of Banking to grant the
same loan and investment powers to the state associations as are granted
to federal associations. 2 The commissioner's response was the following
regulation:
An insured association, subject to the limitations and provisions
of this Subchapter, may make any loan or investment which is
permitted to be made by a Federal savings and loan association by
Federal law or under rules and regulations promulgated by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board under the authority of Section 5 of
"Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933," as amended and supplemented
or as the same may in the future be amended and supplemented."
The combination of the statute and regulation results in the automatic
adoption of certain federal loan and investment powers. It is doubtful
that this was the intent of the New Jersey legislature when it passed the
statutes in question. However, other states' agencies may want to follow
the Banking Commissioner of New Jersey's lead and avoid burdensome
parity regulations.
The final "miscellaneous" category contains two state statutes which
do not fit into any other classification. Nebraska is unique in accomplishing
parity through a yearly legislative enactment which grants the local savings
associations all powers granted to federal associations in the last year."
Wisconsin defines the limitations placed on a federal association's ability
to make property improvement loans as the allowable boundaries for
activities of local savings associations.' 5
REv. CoDEs ANN. § 7-113.1 (1968) (loan and investment powers); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17:12B-152 (West Cure. Supp. 1977) (loan and investment powers); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
48-15-94 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (all powers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-21.2 (b) (Cum. Supp.
1977) (loan and investment powers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 381.9 (West Cum. Supp.
1977-78) (all powers not specified in Oklahoma's savings and loan act); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 722.204 (1975) (all powers); R.I. GEN. LAws § 19-23-15 (A) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (all
powers); S.C. CODE § 34-1-110, 34-25-220 (1976) (all powers); VA. CODE § 6.1-195.35
(Cum. Supp. 1977) (all powers); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-6-41, 31-6-42 (1975) (loan and in-
vestment powers, savings accounts, and most other powers except branching).
'4 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:12B-152 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
43 NJ. ADMiN. CODE § 3.27-4.2 (1977).
44N. REv. STAT. § 8-355 (1977).
45Ws. STAT. ANN. § 215.20 (21) (West. Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
PROJECTrWinter, 1978]
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B. Common Characteristics of Tie-in Legislation
In examining each state's tie-in statute certain characteristics can be
found regardless of category. Of these, three are the most common and
deserve examination. One characteristic is that many state statutes require
that state chartered savings associations be insured or hold membership in
the Federal Home Loan Bank System, or both, to be eligible for these
increased powers."6 This restriction is highly desirable and both requirements
should be added to all tie-in legislation which deals with savings associations.
The insurance requirement is a protection for the public, so that depositors'
accounts will be protected against inexperienced investing by local associa-
tions with newly acquired loan and investment powers. The federal home
loan bank membership seems to be a fair requirement to maintain parity
since federal associations must be members of that system."7
Several states, including Ohio, limit local associations to those powers
given federal associations operating within the state. 8 Again the limitation
is necessary to insure parity between the institutions within a state. The
benefits of parity would not be served by granting a local association a
power not exercisable by the federal association next door. 9
The final characteristic of most tie-in statutes is the inclusion of a
clause, usually the preamble, which states that the statute is granting the
associations powers in spite of any other provision of state law."0 This
phrase results in the implicit repeal of any section of state law which tries
to limit the powers granted by the tie-in statute. The use of such phrases
may pose serious constitutional delegation problems when a state agency
may by regulation modify or repeal another state statute.51
46E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.215 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (requiring FHLB membership);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:12B-15"2 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (requiring the associations to be
insured); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-15-94 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (requiring both insurance and
FILB membership).
47See note 20 supra.
48 E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 5500.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (powers of federal associations
"doing business in this state"); HAw. REv. STAT. § 407-55 (1976) (the powers of federal
institutions "located in this state").
49 For example, federal associations in Maine, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Vermont and Connecticut are now permitted to issue interest bearing savings accounts on which
withdrawal can be made by negotiable instruments (NOW accounts). 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-1 (3)
(1977). Under the Wyoming tie-in statute, state savings association are allowed "all" powers
authorized by the FHLBB for federal associations. Wyo. STAT. § 13-7-102 (b) (Interim.
Supp. 1977). Under this statute, state savings associations in Wyoming could offer NOW
accounts to its customers.
50 See, e.g., the Washington statute at note 26 supra.
51 A New Mexico unreported decision, San Juan Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell, No. 76-364
(D.C. County of San Juan Oct. 12, 1976), has dealt with this exact issue and stated that
a state regulatory agency could not issue a parity regulation which was in direct conffict
with a state statute. Under New Mexico's tie-in statute which provides for a one-at-a-time
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11. SUPREME COURT GUIDELINES FOR DELEGATION
Indeed, the constitutionality of delegating legislative power to adminis-
trative agencies is an issue at the heart of tie-in statutes and parity
regulations formulated for savings associations. This section will explore
United States Supreme Court guidelines for delegating such authority
within constitutional limits.
A. Background of Non-delegation
The Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations in Ohio is
empowered by Ohio Revised Code section 1155.1852 to issue regulations
authorizing the state's building and loan associations to exercise rights and
privileges enjoyed by federal savings and loan associations which have their
home offices in Ohio and were organized under the "Home Owners' Loan
Act of . 933."'53 Whether this delegation of legislative power to an
adoption of federal powers through parity regulations, the superintendent of savings
and loans issued Regulation 73-2. This regulation allowed the creation of branches within
100 miles of the parent association, which was the same branching policy as that of
federal savings associations. A New Mexico statute provided for the creation of branches
only within 50 miles of the parent. 1967 N.M. LAws ch. 61, § 17, as amended by 1973 N.M.
LAWS ch. 189, § 2. The district court, faced with a challenge to the granting of permission
to a savings association to form a branch outside the 50 mile limit, interpreted the tie-in
statute not to permit the promulgation of a regulation which conflicted with a specific
state statute and thus held the granting of permission to establish a branch outside the 50
mile limit to be void and of no effect. The case was appealed but the appeal was dis-
missed on stipulation of the parties. No. 2768 (N.M. Ct. App., Mar. 24, 1977). The dis-
missal was due to legislative action which permitted branches within 100 miles of the
parent and thus rendered the case moot. 1977 N.M. LAws ch. 38 (to be codified in N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-15-61).
52 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1155.18 (Page 1968), states:
Notwithstanding any provision in Chapters 1151., 1153., 1155., and 1157. of the
Revised Code, if federal savings and loan associations organized under the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128, 12 U.S.C. 1461, and amendments thereto, the home
offices of which are located in this state, shall possess a right, power, privilege, or
benefit by virtue of statute, rule, or regulation, or judicial decision or will possess
such right, power, privilege, or benefit by virtue of a rule or regulation issued but
not effective, which right, power, privilege, or benefit is not possessed by a building
and loan association organized under the laws of this state, the superintendent of building
and loan associations may, by regulation, authorize building and loan associations
organized under the laws of this state to exercise such right, power, privilege, or
benefit. A regulation so adopted and promulgated by the superintendent shall become
effective on the date of its issuance but if such regulation is issued by the super-
intendent in anticipation of a federal rule or regulation which has been issued but
has not then become effective, the effective date of the superintendent's regulation
shall be the later date on which the federal rule or regulation becomes effective,
provided that if such regulation adopted and promulgated by the superintendent is
not enacted into law within thirty months from the date such regulation is issued
by the superintendent, such regulation shall thereupon no longer be of any force
* or effect. The superintendent of building and loan associations may upon thirty days'
written notice to domestic building and loan associations revoke any regulation issued
by virtue of the authority of this section.
53 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
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administrative agency violates the constitutional principle of representative
government is a question worthy of analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has frequently addressed the
constitutionality of delegating congressional power.' Because the development
and status of the federal law is similar to that of many state parity statutes,**
the evolution of the federal non-delegation doctrine, discussed below, may
well forecast the direction of the non-delegation doctrine in Ohio and other
states. 8
The Constitution's vesting of all legislative powers in Congress"7 has
historically been interpreted broadly. The first Supreme Court case dealing
with delegation of authority was The Brig Aurora v. United States.5"
Although the Court did not directly decide the delegation issue, it did
imply that delegation would be valid in cases involving determinations of
fact."9 Some eighty years later, in Field v. Clark,"° the Court again stated
that the President was only "ascertaining fact" rather than exercising
legislative power in determining when a tariff statute was to take effect.
The "non-delegation doctrine," or the prohibition against delegating legisla-
tive authority to executive (including administrative) and judicial bodies,
Was based upon the principle of representative government, "that the
legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other body or
authority." 1 This non-delegation doctrine works within the separation of
powers doctrine" to allow the branches of government to operate without
dominating each other. Because delegation was not discussed at the
5 For a more exhaustive discussion of the delegation of authority doctrine, see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 2.01-.10 (3d ed. 1972), [hereinafter cited as DAvIS TEXT];
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINSTRATTVE LAW TREATISE 99 2.01-.16 (1958 & Supp. 1965, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS TREATISE]; B. SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 11-33 (1976);
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 359 (1947).
55 Presently 41 of the states in the U.S. possess parity legislation involving savings associ-
ations, which is similar to Ohio Revised Code section 1155.18.56 See, e.g., Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI L.
REV. 307 (1976).
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
58 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
59 Id. at 386, 388.
60 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1892); this case involved the Chief Executive and the adjustment
of tariffs. The Court stated, 'That Congress cannot delegate legislative power . . . is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution."
61 Commonwealth ex rel. McClain v. Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 494 (1873). See generally Shank-
land v. Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390 (1831); R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 79-80 (1969).
62 See W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINiSTATIvE LAW 46-47 (5th ed. 1970).
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Constitutional Convention,"3 the Court shaped the history of the non-delega-
tion doctrine through its early decisions.
B. The "Standards" Approach
In moving away from the ascertainment of facts approach,6' the Court
attempted to limit the delegation of congressional authority through an
analytical technique known as "filling-up-the-details." This approach,
introduced in United States v. Grimaud,65 conferred upon administrators a
power to "fill up the details" in the general statute in order to carry the
legislative policy into effect.8 6 The Grimaud Court confirmed that the rule-
making function may be delegated, provided it is made to operate within
limits."' This decision, along with Buttfield v. Stranahan,s marked the first
step toward the modem requirement that a statute must articulate standards,
without which administrative rules might be struck down as an unlawful
delegation of authority. It was under this "standard test" that the Court
recognized that legislative powers could be delegated to administrative
agencies, as long as the legislative body was the primary legislator and the
administrative agency, the secondary one.69
Some of the standards the Supreme Court has upheld as sufficient
include "just and reasonable,""0 "[acting] as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires,""1 and "being generally fair and equitable." ' The Court
*aThe only discussion of delegation was a motion by Madison that the President be given
power "to execute such other powers... as may from time to time be delegated by the
national Legislature." This was dismissed as unnecessary. 1 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, 67 (1966). See I DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.02
(1958).
64 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382
(1813).
65 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
as See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 62, at 49-50; Note, Safeguards, Standards, and
Necessity: Permissible Parameters for Legislative Delegations in Iowa, 58 IowA L. REV.
974 (1973).
e7 See also Jaffe, supra note 54, at 567-68.
- 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (involving the setting of a minimum quality standard for imported
tea). However, there is some discussion as to whether Chief Justice White was stating the
modern requirement of a standard, since the word "standard" was also applicable to the
"standard of tea." Jaffe, supra note 54, at 566.
69 See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at § 12.
TOTagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 431, (1930) (upholding a tariff
set by the Secretary of Agriculture, limiting the commission that persons could charge to
buy and sell livestock in the Omaha stockyards).
71 Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 285 U.S. 266, 285 (1933)
(upholding the Radio Commission's power to delete broadcasting stations). Accord, NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding the Federal Communications Commission's
chain broadcasting regulations, which were promulgated pursuant to the Commission's
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in I. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,73 indicated that administrative
officials, in exercising discretion, must be guided by an "intelligible
principle."7" The Court acknowledged that to invalidate transfers of
lawmaking authority to administrative officials, would deprive the -federal
government of an effective means of exercising its powers."
In 1935, the Supreme Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan," held
that the National Industrial Recovery Act unlawfully delegated legislative
authority to the President. Section 9 (c) of the Act empowered the President
to regulate the transportation in interstate commerce of what was commonly
known as "hot-oil" (oil produced in excess of the amount permitted by
state law). However, Congress failed to state under what circumstances the
President could prohibit these shipments. This failure, in the court's opinion,
constituted a delegation of legislative power without adequate standards or
guidelines."
Congressional delegation to a public authority has been invalidated only
once by the Court since the Panama decision." In A. L. A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States," the Court again struck down a legislative delegation
to the President. At issue in Schecter was section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act which authorized the President to approve codes of fair
competition to govern trades and industries. This case involved what has
been termed "the most sweeping congressional delegation of all time"'
because regulations invoked by the President were given the force and effect
power to license broadcasting stations; the criterion involved was the same as that in
Federal Radio Commission).
72 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944), upholding price fixing by an adminis-
trator. The Court found that the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 set the limits of
the Administrator's permissible action; the Act provided that (1) prices were to be fixed
to effectuate the policy of the Acts, (2) prices were to be "fair and equitable", (3) "due
consideration, so far as practicable," was to be given to prevailing prices.during the designated
base period, and (4) adjustments were to be made to compensate for factors affecting prices.
For a discussion of delegation of legislative power involving price controls, see Comment,
The Constitutionality of the Delegation of Legislative Power to Control Prices, Rents,
Wages and Salaries: Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 48 Csn.-KENT L. REv.- 279 (1971).
7- 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
74 Id. at 409.
75 Id. at 407-08.
,6 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
77 Judge Cardozo dissented, finding an adequate standard in section. 1 of the Act, -which
states that: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove, obstructions to the
free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which. tend to diminish the amount thereof;
and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the
purpose of cooperative action among trade groups...
78 See 1 DAvis TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.01.
79295 U.S. 495 (1935).
80 1 DAvis TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.06. •
[Vol._II:3
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss3/4
Winter, 1978]
of law. Tlhe statute went so far as to make violations of such presidential
edicts punishable as crimes.
Since the Panama and Schecter cases, the Supreme Court has upheld
every congressional delegation of power to a governmental authority.81i
However, delegations to private individuals and delegations involving
criminal determinations have been struck. 2 The Supreme Court's attitude
toward the delegation issue is apparent in a number of later cases. Challenged
in Lichter v. United States" was a law which authorized administrative
officers to recover profits from war contracts they deemed excessive.
Although the statute did not define the term "excessive profits," it was held
to articulate a sufficient standard. Similarly, the Attorney General's authority
to grant or deny bail to aliens8" was upheld in Carlson v. Landon.85 The
Act grants the Attorney General discretionary power to continue an alien
in custody, release him under bond, or place him on conditional parole
pending determination of his deportability.G The Court stated that this
wide range of discretion was warranted by the varied circumstances which
must be considered in deporting aliens.8" The Court further stated that a
clear national policy regarding the deportation of aliens set a standard which
sufficiently limited executive judgment.8" The Court's struggle to infer
"standards" in the Internal Security Act has been criticized as reducing the
standards requirement to an "empty form" which does not restrict congres-
sional delegation in any meaningful way. 9
A third post World War II case, Fahey v. Mallone I, upheld the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board's power to issue regulations concerning
81 Id.
82 See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), in which the delegation
to producers and miners, of the power to regulate miners' wages and hours was character-
ized as delegation in its most radical form, i.e., to private parties whose interests might be
adverse to interests of others in the same business. See also, Liebmann, Delegation to Private
Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IN. L.J. 650 (1975); Jaffe, Law Making by
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201 (1937); Note, 37 COLum. L. REv. 447 (1937). As
to -delegations involving criminal determinations, see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1958). But see Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940), where an administrative
penalty was upheld. For a discussion of the distinction between guilt and administrative
penalties, see 1 DAVIs TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.13.
8-334 U.S. 742 (1948). See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at § 16.
84 Internal Security Act of 1950, § 23, 64 Stat. 1010 (repealed 1952).
85 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
86 Internal Security Act of 1950, § 23, 64 Stat. 1010 (repealed 1952); 1 DAVIs TREATISE,
supra note 54, at § 2.04.
;7 See 1 DAvis TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.04.
88 342 U.S. at 542-44.
89 B. SCHwARTZ, supra note 54, at § 13.
90 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
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when a conservator or receiver might be appointed to take charge of a
failing federal savings association. The District Court for Southern
California, ruling that this was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority,
stated that no intelligible principle or standard had been advanced by
Congress. 1 Reversing, the Supreme Court based its approval of the
delegation not on the existence of such a standard but on the grounds that
the regulations involved were regulatory in nature and not penal."
Furthermore, Professor Kenneth Davis, in his Administrative Law Treatise,
makes this comment on the Court's rationale in Fahey:
when Congress fails to state a standard or intelligible principle, the
deficiency - if it is a deficiency - may be corrected by administrative
regulations. The holding in the Fahey case is a clear-cut denial of the
proposition that Congress must state a standard, a general policy, or
an intelligible principle. 3
In Fahey, the complaint had charged that the chairman and conservator
had seized the failing institution without due process of law because, in
accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Board, a hearing had
taken place after the conservator took possession of the institution, rather
than before. The Court's failure to recognize a due process violation in
Fahey sounded a death knell for the non-delegation doctrine.". Only five
years earlier, in Panama and Schecter, the Court had found actions which
were regulatory in nature to be unconstitutional delegations of legislative
authority. Then in Fahey the Court examined an adjudicatory-type action,
traditionally subject to more procedural safeguards than are regulatory
matters,95 and found that the delegation was constitutional despite lack of
prior notice and a hearing. Given this difference in types of actions
considered in Panama and Schecter and then in Fahey, the Fahey decision
must be viewed as a giant step away from the non-delegation doctrine.
C. The "Rule of Reason" Approach
More recent cases upholding the delegation of legislative authority
have employed what is called the "rule of reason," or the search for
91 Mallonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
92 332 U.S. at 250. The regulations governing the issue in Fahey now appear at 12 C.F.R.
§ 547 (1977).
93 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.04.
94 See infra note 103.
95 See, e.g., 1 DAVIs TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.11. See also Rankin-Thoman v. Caldwell,
42 Ohio St. 2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 (1975), for an analysis of the distinction between
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial and rule-making or quasi-legislative functions as it pertains
to the right to appeal under both situations, pursuant to OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-
13 (Page 1978), which comprises the Administrative Procedure Act in Ohio.
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safeguards, approach." In 1963, the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California" upheld a statute allowing the Secretary of the Interior to choose
among "recognized methods of apportionment or to devise reasonable
methods of his own" 8 in apportioning the waters of the Colorado River.
Likewise, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally," the D. C. Circuit
Court upheld the President's discretionary power under the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 to issue regulations in order to stabilize rents,
salaries, and wages. These powers were similar to those delegated by the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and upheld in Yakus v. United
States;' however, unlike the statute involved in Yakus, which contained
some standards for the use of discretion, the Economic Stabilization Act
granted to the President 'the above mentioned powers with minimal
standards. Professor Bernard Schwartz, in commenting on the Connally
decision, noted in his text on administrative law, "If ever there was a
delegation without standards, this was it."'' The court relied on Yakus to
justify the delegation on the grounds that the standards were inherent in
the authority to stabilize prices and wages. °2
In 1969, Professor Davis summarized the status of the non-delegation
doctrine by stating:
The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. It has not
prevented the delegation of legislative power. Nor has it accomplished
its later purpose of assuring that delegated power will be guided by
meaningful standards. More importantly, it has failed to provide
needed protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary
power. The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that the
non-delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to
protect against arbitrary administrative power.'
But this was not to be. In 1974, in National Cable Television Association,
Inc. v. United States,' the Court acknowledged that a legislative grant of
power to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate fee-setting
by community antenna televisions systems resembled the revenue-seeking role
96 1 DAviS TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 2.04 (Supp. 1965).
97 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
98 Id. at 593.
99 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
100 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
101 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at § 18.
102 Id.
103 Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 713 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Davis, A New Approach].
104 415 U.S. 336 (1974), examining the scope of the Independent Offices Appropriations Act
of 1952, 31 U.S.C. § 483 (a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), whereby each federal agency could
prescribe regulations for imposing fees for services. See also Freedman, supra note 56, at 319.
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of the House Appropriations Committee. The Court recognized that such
a role could pose serious constitutional problems regarding delegation of
legislative power. However, the majority avoided the problem by stating that
the statute should be construed "narrowly as authorizing not a 'tax' but a
'fee'."' ° In so doing, the phrase "value to the recipient," which was embodied
in the statute, was articulated as the appropriate standard by which the
Commission's power would be measured. Professor James Freedman,
commenting on this case, stated that:
[b]y relying upon Schecter to confine the statutory language .... the
Court sought to bring the case within the delegation principle and to
warn Congress that if it intended to delegate the power to levy taxes
to an administrative agency, it should do so explicitly and with full
awareness that such a decision would raise serious constitutional
questions.'
Following National Cable, in 1976, the Court in Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,"°7 upheld the President's power
to adjust imports to protect national security.' However, the opinion was
a narrow one expressly limited to the factual setting of imposing license fees
by the President pursuant to section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act.
In addition, the Court rejected as ill founded the conclusion that any action
taken by the President relating to imports was also authorized by the
decision. The inference was clear that under other facts, such delegation
might be viewed as improper."'
D. The Future of the Delegation Doctrine
On that basis, Professor Freedman has speculated that even if the
non-delegation doctrine is making a comeback, the revival of this doctrine
must go beyond "the doctrine's traditional teaching that Congress must
state meaningful statutory standards for the exercise of delegated legislative
105 415 U.S. at 341.
10 Freedman, supra note 56, at 321.
107 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
108 Section 232 (b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (b) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), delegated this power to the President.
109 It is apparent that the Court does not want to extinguish totally the non-delegation
doctrine. Freedman, supra note 56, at 335-36. (The opinion of the court in National Cable,
by relying on Schecter, might even suggest a revival of this doctrine.) See also California
Banker's Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 90-91 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. at 626 (Harlan, J., with Stewart and Douglas, J.J., dissenting). But see National
Cable, 415 U.S. 336 wherein Mr. Justice Marshall strongly criticizes the resurrection of the
delegation doctrine; United States v. Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976) (in
which the court allowed broad congressional delegation to the President of control con-
cerning the export/import of arms).
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power.""' In expanding on this point Professor Freedman suggests that:
Whenever a court concludes that the Framers regarded the proper exer-
cise of a specific legislative power as closely dependent upon the unique
institutional competence of Congress, the non-delegation doctrine would
prohibit Congress from delegating that power to another. In these
circumstances, the act of delegation would so alter the manner of
the power's exercise that the resulting arrangement would no longer
be compatible with the Framers' reasons for vesting the power in an
institution whose character and nature are defined in the special
ways - of political responsiveness and broad-based diversity - that
those of Congress are. The informing principle of institutional compe-
tence as a guide to the constitutionality of the delegation of legislative
power thus focuses on the tension between the nature of the particular
power delegated and the character of the particular institution chosen
to exercise it.""
If the non-delegation doctrine is not revived along the lines suggested
by Professor Freedman or those established in Panama"' and Schecter,10
then the need for administrative standards becomes paramount. In view of
this, and recognizing the fact that delegations to administrative agencies
are necessary,"' Professor Davis suggests that the non-delegation doctrine
can be altered to provide for those standards as safeguards. In explaining
this view Professor Davis states that, "[t]he key should no longer be statutory
words; it should be the protections the administrators in fact provide,
irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say.""' This would assure that
the non-delegation doctrine's purpose of "protecting against unnecessary and
uncontrolled discretionary power""' 6 would be effectuated. Once it is decided
that it is necessary to delegate certain powers, Professor Davis states that:
[t]he courts should develop a requirement that as far as practicable
administrators must structure their discretionary power through
appropriate safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary
power through standards, principles, and rules." 7
Some courts have already begun to develop this requirement. The
D. C. Circuit Court requires administrative officers to clarify standards
110 Freedman, supra note 56, at 336.
11 .d.
112293 U.S. 388 (1935).
11295 U.S. 495 (1935).
114 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940), where it was recog-
nized that without delegation the exercise of legislative power might become a futility.
15 Davis, A New Approach, supra note 103.
116 Id.
117 DAvis TEXT, supra note 54, at § 2.10. See the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-59 (1976), as to the present procedure and safeguards.
PROJECT
19
et al.: Tie-In Statutes and Parity Regulations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
AKRON LAw REVIEW
which guide their exercise of discretionary power."' In so doing, the court
noted, "[w]e stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts.""1 "
It is evident that delegated legislative power will be subject to safeguards
in this "new era," whether they are masked in the form of a revamped
non-delegation doctrine or in the form of administrative standards.
IV. OHIO'S APPROACH TO DELEGATED AUTHORITY
To determine whether the rule-making power given to the Superinten-
dent of the Building and Loan Associations under Ohio Revised Code
section 1155.18"0 constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority, it is
necessary to trace the delegation of authority doctrine in Ohio. In so doing,
the validity of this legislative grant will be questioned on two levels:
(1) Does the statute set adequate standards for the exercise of delegated
power? and (2) Do any procedural safeguards control the Superintendent's
rule-making power?.1
The Ohio Constitution vests legislative power in the General Assembly,""
just as the U.S. Constitution vests such power in Congress.12 Therefore, the
Ohio Superintendent of Building & Loan Associations may be challenged on
state constitutional grounds for exercising power properly belonging to the
state legislature, just as federal administrators have been challenged for
improperly exercising congressional authority. For the purpose of this
discussion, the development of decisional law relating to legislative delega-
tions in Ohio will be divided into three categories: (1) early cases including
those which led to the standards rationale; (2) cases which formulated the
standards test; and (3) cases which are the most relevant to analyze
section 1155.18 within the context of necessary standards and delegation
of authority.
A. Pre-Standards Cases
In Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.R. Co. v. Commissioners,' the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld a statute which authorized county commissioners to
approve the issuance of bonds in order to pay for capital stock to which
118 Environmental Defense Fund,, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
119 Id. at 597.
L20See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1155.18 (Page 1968); supra note 52 for text of statute.
121 See Davis, A New Approach, supra note 103.
122 Omo CONST. art. H, § 1. Often the Ohio delegation statutes have also been challenged
on the following Ohio constitutional provisions: art. II, § 26, which states that "all laws,
of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state"; art. X, § 1, county
home rule provision; art. XVIII, § 2, municipal home rule provision.
2
2 8 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
124 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
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the commissioners had subscribed. Justice Ranney, writing for the court,
distinguished between the power to make law, which may never be delegated,
and the administrative power to execute law, which may be delegated. The
court found that approving the bond issuance was merely executing a law.1"5
The case has been widely cited, even by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Panama decision.12
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner.'.
upheld the power of an administrative body, the forerunner of the Workmen's
Compensation Board, to ascertain certain facts and apply the law to those
facts. In rejecting arguments that the board had exercised judicial authority,
the court relied on the Ohio common law principle that "a statute may
leave to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of
facts .... ,"I The court also noted that this law was enacted pursuant to a
police power." 9 The quoted language in Fassig is similar to that used
earlier in Green v. Civil Service Commission,"' upholding the Civil Service
Commission's power to adopt, amend and suspend rules. The court suggested
that the Civil Service Commission merely ascertained whether facts before
it met statutory requirements. Both Green and Fassig employed what has
been described as the fact-finding rationale. Under that approach, the
delegation of authority will survive constitutional challenge if the executive
or administrative body simply determines whether certain facts exist which
trigger application of a statute.'
Although the fact-finding rationale provided a simple test for judging
125 d. at 90.
126 293 U.S. 388 (1935). The U.S. Supreme Court, in discussing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
1892), cited Cincinnati, W. and Z R.R. Co. stating:
The Ohio Supreme Court referred with approval to the distinction pointed out by
the Supreme Court ... between "the delegation power to make the law, which necessar-
ily involves a discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law."
293 U.S. at 426.
Justice Ranney concluded this statement by suggesting that "The first can not be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made." I Ohio St. at 88-89. See also, 1 COOPER, STATE
ADMImSTRATvE LAw 31-328 (1965). Cooper labels this distinction as the true test. id.
at 48.
12795 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917).
128 d. at 246, 116 N.E. at 108.
129 See cases cited infra at notes 137 and 141, wherein this police power distinction becomes
apparent.
13090 Ohio St. 252, 107 N.E. 531 (1914).
131 These later cases have likewise involved the fact-finding rationale; Belden v. Union
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, N.E.2d 629, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 674 (1944)
(stating that the legislature may clothe administrative officers with the power to ascertain
whether certain facts exist); Strain v. Southerton, 75 Ohio App. 435, 62 N.E.2d 633 (1945),
aff'd, 148 Ohio St. 153, 74 N.E.2d 69 (1947) (statute fixing procedure whereby the ad-
ministrative agency was to prescribe minimum wages).
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the propriety of administrative delegation, Ohio courts continued to find
additional reasons for upholding delegation. A classic example is Yee Bow v.
City of Cleveland,3"' in which the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a health
commissioner's power to ascertain whether the sanitary and drainage
arrangements in a laundry were sufficient to protect the public health. The
court employed not only a fact-finding rationale, but also stressed the
agency's role in protecting public health and noted that arbitrary agency
action could be remedied by a reviewing court." It is apparent that even
at this stage the court was struggling to uphold the delegation of power to
an administrative agency in the belief that delegation is necessary in order
that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility.' 4 It was
this struggle which prompted Ohio courts to adopt the standards test.
B. Standards Test in Ohio
After the U.S. Supreme decisions in Panama... and Schecter,3 6 a
dispute over the power of the Public Utilities Commission to prescribe
safety regulations for motor transportation companies gave the Ohio Supreme
Court an opportunity to apply a limited standards test to a challenge based
on the Ohio Constitution."' The court in Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co.1
3 8
stated:
It has been generally held that a legislative body in conferring such
power should lay down definite rules of guidance in restricting or
limiting the exercise of such official action; but an exception to the
rule is recognized in certain cases where the establishment of such
criteria would be impossible or impracticable, or would result in
rendering the enforcement of a police regulation nugatory or ineffective.
Although the court was not faced with defining standards, it did note in
dictum that "it is essential to the validity of such rules and regulations that
they be reasonable and neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor in conflict
with the law."1 In adopting the standards test, the court excepted situations
where the establishment of criteria would be impossible and/or impractical
and where definite guidelines would undermine a police power regulation.
The police power exception to the standards test has been upheld on
132 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N.E. 132 (1919), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921).
'33 See notes 137 and 141 infra. Statutes delegating police powers, (i.e., dealing with health,
safety, morals and general welfare) have been excepted from the standards analysis.
134 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
135 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
1ss 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
137 Matz v. J.L. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937).
138 ld. at 278-79, 7 N.E.2d at 224.
13
9 Id. at 286, 7 N.E.2d at 227.
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numerous occasions140 and is well settled law in Ohio. Illustrative is Weber v.
Board of Health,1 4 1 in which the Ohio Supreme Court scrutinized a resolution
by the Butler County Board of Health, which made it unlawful to transport,
deliver or deposit collected garbage to feed animals. Although the statute
did not propose any guidelines or standards, the court, citing Matz, held:
As a general rule a law which confers discretion on an executive officer
or board without establishing any standards for guidance is a delegation
of legislative power and unconstitutional; but when the discretion to
be exercised relates to a police regulation for the protection of the
public morals, health, safety or general welfare, and it is impossible or
impracticable to provide such standards, and to do so would defeat
the legislative object sought to be accomplished, legislation conferring
such discretion may be valid and constitutional without such restrictions
and limitations.'
Although this part of the Board's action was upheld, the court rejected a
second resolution which authorized the Health Commissioner to approve a
collection system without further Board review. The court concluded that
this delegation to the Health Commissioner constituted "legislation upon the
part of the Board"' 3 and that the Commissioner's power went "far beyond
the exercise of a proper administrative rule-making power."'44
C. Standards Test Applied to Section 1155.18
It is at least arguable that Ohio Revised Code section 1155.18 similarly
confers powers on the Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations,
allowing him discretion without sufficient standards to guide his actions.
Therefore, a closer examination of this statute and the status of the
standards test in Ohio is in order.
Section 1155.18 allows the Superintendent to promulgate regulations
which authorize a building and loan association, organized under the laws
of Ohio, to exercise the same right, power, privilege, or benefit that a
federal savings and loan association whose home offices are located in this
state might exercise by statute, judicial decision, rule or regulation.'
That is, the Superintendent has open-ended discretion to issue any rules and
140 See generally Knall Beverage Co. v. Taylor, 68 Ohio App. 263, 39 N.E.2d 179 (1941), ap-
peal dismissed, 139 Ohio St. 171, 38 N.E.2d 411 (1941); Standard 'Tote" Inc. v. Ohio State
Racing Comm'n, 58 Ohio Op. 337, 121 N.E.2d 463, (Franklin County C.P.), motion denied,
98 Ohio App. 494, 130 N.E.2d 455 (1954). But see American Cancer Society, Inc. v. Dayton,
160 Ohio St. 114, 114 N.E.2d 219 (1953).
I'l 148 Ohio St. 389, 74 N.E.2d 331 (1941).
142 id. at 397, 74 N.E.2d at 336.
143 Id. at 398, 74 N.E.2d at 336.
'4, Id. at 400, 74 N.E.2d at 337.
45 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1155.18 (Page 1968).
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regulations he sees fit. The only limitation is that any benefit he confers
must be one possessed by a federal savings and loan association which has
its home office in this state.
Interwoven with the standards rationale are a number of tests which
measure the validity of such delegation. The Court of Appeals of Franklin
County, in State ex rel. Eichenberger v. Neff, noted that a statute which
delegates authority must be complete on its face, leaving only execution
for the administrator's discretion.146 In distinguishing between making and
executing the laws, the Franklin County court echoed the analysis of
Justice Ranney some 122 years earlier in the Cincinnati Railroad decision."'
A good example of such "complete" legislation is the air pollution
control statute upheld by the Ashtabula County Court of Appeals in State
v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal."8 The statute, "9 which allows the Director
of Environmental Protection to adopt air pollution control regulations, had
been rejected by the lower court as an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority.' 5 Reversing, the court of appeals stated that the statutory
standards for the director's rule-making were explicit and precise.
Furthermore, the court noted that the legislation presented "an interwoven
statutory scheme in which the power of the director to adopt regulations is
carefully circumscribed, both substantively and procedurally."'' l The inter-
woven statutory scheme of Ohio Revised Code section 3704.03, which was
approved by the court, reads in pertinent part:
The director of environmental protection may:
(D) Adopt, modify, and repeal regulations for the prevention,
control, and abatement of air pollution from all sources throughout
the state, prescribing ambient air quality standards for the state as
a whole or for various areas of the state. In adopting, amending,
modifying, or repealing such regulations the director shall hear and
give consideration to evidence relating to:
(1) The character and degree of any injury to human health or
welfare, plant or animal life, or property, or any unreasonable inter-
ference with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property as the
result of air pollution;
146See State ex rel. Eichenberger v. Neff, 42 Ohio App. 2d 69, 330 N.E.2d 454 (1974);
Neuweiler v. Kauer, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 536, 107 N.E.2d 779 (Sandusky County C.P.
1951).
147 See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
14849 Ohio App. 2d 371, 361 N.E.2d 250 (1974).
14 9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03 (Page Supp. 1977).
15036 Ohio Misc. 55, 302 N.E.2d 605 (Ashtabula Mun. Ct. 1973), sub nom. State v.
Richmond.
'51 49 Ohio App. 2d at 374, 361 N.E.2d at 253.
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(2) Conditions calculated to result from compliance with such
standards and their relation to benefits to the people of the state to
be derived from such compliance;
(3) The quantity and characteristics of air contaminants and the
frequency and duration of their presence in the ambient air;
(4) Topography, prevailing wind directions and velocities, physical
conditions and other factors which may or may [sic] combine to affect
air pollution.
Further, Ohio Revised Code section 3704.04 provides that the adoption,
modification and repeal of regulations shall be in accordance with fte
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 ' By contrast, section 1155.18 gives the
Superintendent of Savings Associations not one factor or guideline to
consider when issuing regulations. It might safely be said that the standards
accompanying section 1155.18 are not such that they "[define] the policy
of the law and [contain] sufficient criteria and standards to guide the
administrative officer or tribunal in the exercise of its limited discretion."' 5
This is the standards test established by the Ohio Supreme Court in State
ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried.5"
In two closely related areas, Ohio courts have struck down legislation
which delegated adjudicatory authority to an administrative agency either
to impose criminal penalties or to infringe on private property without
procedural safeguards. Although these situations are distinguishable from the
situation presented by section 1155.18, the cases are worthy of brief
examination.
The defendant in State v. Prairan,'5' challenged Ohio Revised Code
section 1541.11, which empowered the state's Division of Parks, Department
of National Resources to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations to
control watercraft upon reservoir waters in accordance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.'5" The defendant was criminally charged with violating
a number of rules adopted pursuant to this section and faced a fine of not
152 OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1978).
153 State ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 470, 127 N.E.2d
371, 372 (1955).
154 Id.
55 80 Ohio Law Abs. 484, 159 N.E.2d 829 (Licking County C.P. 1958). For further
decisions involving a statute which confers upon an administrative authority the power to
enact penal provisions, see: State ex rel. Allen v. Ferguson, 155 Ohio St. 26, 97 N.E.2d
660 (1951) (in which the court refused to rule on a statute which delegated to a com-
mission the power to issue rules and regulations which, if violated, were punishable as
misdemeanors by fine); Pollak Steel Co. v. Tax Commission, 21 Ohio Op. 217 (Hamilton
County C.P. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 70 Ohio App. 322, 41 N.E.2d 428 (1942) (strik-
ing a statute which gave the Tax Commission the discretionary power to assess penalties
without guidelines or procedural due process protections for the assessed corporation).
156 Otno Rav. CODE ANN. § 119.01-.13 (Page 1978).
PROJECTWinter, 1978]
25
et al.: Tie-In Statutes and Parity Regulations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
AKRON LAW REVIEW
less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars as defined by Revised Code
section 1541.99. The Common Pleas Court of Licking County, in determining
that this legislation was an unconstitutional delegation of authority, stated:
"the Legislature leaves to the discretion of the Division of State Parks, and
to the whim of subordinate officials, the determination of what conduct on
the inland waters of this State will constitute a crime to which the penalty
will be applied."' 7 To emphasize its point, the court examined a parallel
situation and queried: "Could the Legislature confer upon the Department
of Highways the power to determine what conduct on the part of motorists
in Ohio constitutes various traffic offenses?" The court's answer was
conclusive: "[o]bviously not."' 8
The Findlay Municipal Court in State v. Wallace"5 9 also struck down
the delegation of an adjudicatory-type power. In that case, the challenged
statute.6 ° authorized the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas to plug any well
incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial quantities and to impose
penalties on the owners of such uncapped wells. In holding the statute
unconstitutional, the court stated that the Chief of the Division of Oil and
Gas was "vested with unlimited authority at his discretion without the
requisite guideline, yardstick or other measuring device .... ,,'s' Similarly,
in Department of Education v. Board of Education,' the court struck down
a state statute 6" empowering the Superintendent of Public Instruction, upon
the recommendation of an advisory board appointed by him, to classify,
charter and revoke the charter of high schools which he felt failed to meet
the standards prescribed by the State Department of Education. This school-
by-school adjudicatory-type examination, was found by the court to lack
any standards of guidance and, as such, to be an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority.
17 80 Ohio Law Abs. at 487, 159 N.E.2d at 832.
158 Id. Pursuant to this decision, the Ohio General Assembly repealed the statute.
159 40 Ohio Misc. 29, 318 N.E.2d 883 (Hancock County Mun. Ct. 1974).
1860Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.12 (Page Supp. 1976).
161 40 Ohio Misc. at 31-32, 318 N.E.2d at 885. In State v. Wallace, 52 Ohio App. 2d.
264, 270, 369 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1976), a second action which involved the same defendant and
adjudicatory-type determination as that considered by Findlay Municipal Court, the Court
of Appeals for Putnam County reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint against
Mr. Wallace because as applied to those facts, the statute "does not constitute legislation
objectionable under the constitution or otherwise for ambiguity, vagueness or uncertainty."
In explaining the earlier Findlay Municipal Court's rationale in declaring this statute uncon-
stitutional, the Court of Appeals stated that the authority exercised by the Chief was
solely that prescribed by statute; therefore the issue was whether the statute was vague
and/or ambiguous and not whether it constituted an unlawful delegation of authority.
162 96 Ohio App. 429, 122 N.E.2d 192, appeal dismissed, 160 Ohio St. 240, 115 N.E.2d 841
(1953).
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. Although section 1155.18, on its face, does not contain penal or
adjudicatory provisions, it is conceivable that a rule or regulation issued by
the Ohio Superintendent pursuant to the federal framework might contain
a penal provision or confer adjudicatory authority on the Superintendent.
In either situation, a strong argument could be made that section 1155.18
was then unconstitutional as applied.16'
The Ohio Supreme Court's most recent decision involving a challenge
to rule-making authority came in State v. Schreckengost 65 in which the
court upheld a statute which allows the Division of Parks and Recreation to
"make and enforce such rules and regulations, including the appointment
and government of park and patrol officers." ' The statute specifies that
these rules and regulations be made in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act.16 In upholding this delegation of power, the court stated
that the statute was to be read in pari materia with section 1541.03 which
states that state park lands and waters shall be under the control and
management of the Division of Parks and Recreation. The court further
stressed that the rules and regulations were to be adopted pursuant to the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 6 ' Because
of these safeguards, the court reasoned, articulated standards are not
necessary.
Likewise, in 1970, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Switzer"9 up-
held a statute which allows the Chief of the Division of Wildlife to varythe minimum length which fish must attain to be kept without penalty."
The court stated that liberal construction has generally been given to
statutes which serve the public welfare and "that the control over fish and
game is a proper subject for delegation of legislative power." ' 1
In conclusion, although Ohio Revised Code section 1155.18 might be
attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority under a
-
6 For a further example of conferred adjudicatory type power, see State ex rel. Selected
Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d 371 (1953). But see Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) wherein the Court upheld a semi-adjudicatory type situ-
ation involving the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
165 30 Ohio St. 2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 50 (1972). See also Provens v. Ohio Real Estate Comm'n,
45 Ohio App. 2d 45, 341 N.E.2d 329 (1975), in which the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County noted that the legislature had established guidelines in conferring adjudicatory-type
licensing authority upon the Ohio Real Estate Commission. Concurring with the result,
Whiteside, J., found that the statute (Omo R v. CoDE ANN. § 4735.07 (Page 1977))
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
I"e Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 1541.09 (Page 1964).
16Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 119.01-.13 (Page 1978).
16 See 30 Ohio St. 2d at 33, 282 N.E.2d at 53.
1922 Ohio St. 2d 47, 257 N.E.2d 908 (1970).
IT Ono Rnv. CoDE ANN. § 1531.08 (Page Supp. 1977).
1T22 Ohio St. 2d at 51, N.E.2d at 911.
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"completeness" or standards theory," success is doubtful. Admittedly, the
statute is not complete on its face in the sense that the Superintendent has
virtually open-ended discretion to issue rules and regulations." 3 Neither does
the statute "define the policy of the law and contain sufficient criteria and
standards to guide the administrative officer . . in the exercise of [hisi
limited discretion."' 1 '
Nevertheless, these deficiencies need not mandate that a court find
that the statute lacks adequate safeguards or standards. Because the statute
on its face neither specifies penalties nor confers adjudicatory-type authority
on the Superintendent, these grounds, used successfully to challenge Ohio
enabling statutes in the past,' 5 cannot be invoked. Further, the highest and
most recent authority on the subject, State v. Schreckengost,"' has upheld
rule-making authority granted in a statute similar to section 1155.18.
Even if a challenger should argue successfully that section 1155.18 failed
to set down adequate standards to control administrative discretion, he
would still have to overcome the authority of Matz v. Cartage Co.,"'7 which
was affirmed in Schreckengost, that wide discretion is permissible in
administering police regulations for the protection of the public morals,
health, safety, or general welfare. That section 1155.18 is a police regulation
is clear.""8
D. Section 1155.18 and Procedural Due Process
This is not to say that section 1155.18 is impregnable. Although its
lack of standards may be justified by its police function, a stronger
constitutional failing may be its lack of effective procedural safeguards.
It will be shown that the current statutory scheme enables the Superintendent
of Building and Loan Associations to promulgate rules and regulations
with few or no procedural requirements.
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act'" provides for the necessary
notice and hearing requirements normally afforded when a rule or regulation
172 See text accompanying notes 145-64 supra.
173 See text accompanying notes 145-53 supra.
74 See 163 Ohio St. at 470, 127 N.E.2d at 372.
175See State v. Prairan, 80 Ohio Law Abs. 484, 159 N.E.2d 829 (Licking County C.P.
1958).
176 30 Ohio St. 2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 50 (1972).
illSee 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937).
78 See generally Noble State Bank v- Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), where it was stated
that the police power extends to all great public needs and includes the enforcement of
commercial conditions such as the protection of bank deposits and checks drawn against
them; Leonard v. State, 100 Ohio St. 456, 127 N.E. 464 (1919), police power applies to
health, safety, protection or general welfare.
179 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1978).
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is to be issued by an administrative authority."' 0 However, in order to come
within the purview of the Procedure Act, the rule must be "adopted,
promulgated, and enforced by any agency... "181 The definition of "agency"
appears in section 119.01(A) of the Procedure Act, and each governmental
entity which is considered an agency under this section must promulgate
rules in compliance with section 119.01-.13 procedures. The Superintendent
is specifically excepted under the section 119.01 definition of agency, which
states:
Sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to
the . . . . Superintendent of building and loan associations under
section 1155.18 of the Revised Code ....
This specific exception allows the Superintendent to issue rules and
regulations without the safeguards afforded by the Procedure Act.'83 The one
procedure with which the Superintendent must comply is the filing require-
ment of section 111.15 (B) which specifies that he file two certified copies
of any rule he promulgates with both the Secretary of State and the
Director of the Legislative Reference Bureau. Such rules are to become
effective on the tenth day after filing."'
That the Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations and his
rules are subject to this requirement is clear. "Agency" is defined in section
111.15(a) (2) as any governmental entity of the state including any board,
department, or division. The Building and Loan Association unit, as a
division operating within the Department of Commerce,' falls within this
definition. Furthermore, section 111.15 (A) (1) defines rule as "any rule,
regulation, by law, or standard having a general and uniform operation
adopted by an agency . . . ." When these two sections are read together,
it can be seen that any rule issued by the Superintendent of Building and
Loan Associations pursuant to section 1155.18 would have to comply with
section 111.15 filing procedure described above. However, the filing
'sO See generally Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1125.06 (Page Supp. 1976), which states that the
Superintendent of Banks must promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with § 119.01-
.13.
181 OHo Rev. CODE ANN. § 119.01 (C) (Page 1978) (emphasis added).
18i d. § 119.01 (A).
1 3 Otuo REV. CODE §§ 119.01-.13 provides for: notice of hearing, date, time and place of
hearing, adjudication hearing, the right to appeal from orders adopted by an agency,
representation by counsel, all as part of the procedural scheme.
184 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 111.15 (Page 1978) as amended by Sub. H.B. No. 25, 112th G.A.
(1977-78) (eff. Nov. 4, 1977).
185 This structure Was created pursuant to Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.07-.08 (Page 1978).
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requirement is the only procedure with which the Superintendent must comply
when promulgating a rule or regulation pursuant to section 1155.18.188
Nonetheless, there are a number of safeguards inherent in section
1155.18. First, the Ohio Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations
can only issue rules that give to the state associations privileges already
possessed by the federal associations. This procedure operates as an indirect
safeguard since any rule adopted by the Ohio Superintendent must at one
time have been enacted pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedure
Act.187 The second inherent safeguard is that any regulation promulgated
by the Ohio Superintendent has a maximum life span of thirty months if
it is not then enacted into law. That is, if the rule promulgated by the
Superintendent is not enacted into law within thirty months, the state rule
or regulation shall "thereupon no longer be of any force or effect."18'
Although this thirty-month limitation appears to limit the period during
which the regulation is effective, there is nothing on the face of the law
to prevent the Superintendent from promulgating the same regulation ad
infinitum after the original regulation has expired. In this way, a state
regulation could enjoy perpetual life.
In a number of cases, Ohio courts have upheld the delegation of
rule-making power to an administrative authority, but in so doing have
specifically noted that the rules could only be promulgated in accordance
with the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act.18 The Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Schreckengost 9 ° quoting from State v. Switzer,"9' determined that
since the rule-making authority was to be accomplished only pursuant to the
procedural requirements of the Act, specific standards were not necessary.
It follows that since rules promulgated pursuant to section 1155.18 do not
have to be adopted in accordance with these procedural requirements, the
statute must set forth definite standards. Since section 1155.18 does not
contain adequate standards, neither of these requirements is met. Because
section 1155.18 does not include adequate safeguards and rules promulgated
pursuant to the statute can be enacted without procedural due process, an
Ohio court might view the statute as an unconstitutional delegation of
authority.
186 There are certain minor requirements contained within OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 111.15
(B) (1), (2), (3), (4) (Page 1978), as amended by Sub. H.B. No. 25, 112th G.A. (1977-
78) (eff. Nov. 4, 1977) which do not bear any relation to procedural due process.
187 See discussion of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976)
at text accompanying notes 198-202 infra.
188 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1155.18 (Page Supp. 1976).
189 See generally State v. Switzer, 22 Ohio St. 2d 47, 257 N.E.2d 908 (1970); State v. Acme
Scrap Iron & Metal, 49 Ohio App. 2d 371, 361 N.E.2d 250 (1974).
190 30 Ohio St. 2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 50 (1972).
19, 22 Ohio St. 2d 47, 257 N.E.2d 908 (1970).
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The simple solution would be for the General Assembly to mandate
that any rules or regulations adopted pursuant to section 1155.18 be
promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The
building and loan industry, backed by the Superintendent, insists that section
1155.18 must be specifically excepted from the procedural requirements in
order to expedite much needed law.19 What the industry ignores, however,
is that a statutory provision could be made for enacting emergency
regulations without observing the Act's procedural requirements. Such
emergency provisions are already found in sections 119.03 (F) and 111.15.193
In this way most regulations would be enacted in accordance with procedural
safeguards, although emergency regulations could take effect immediately.
If the constitutionality of section 1155.18 and the rules adopted
pursuant to it were challenged today on a procedural theory, Ohio courts
would likely find that the General Assembly had unlawfully delegated its
authority to the Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations.
Reasoning from Ohio common law, a court would be justified in stressing
not only that the statute fails to state any standards by which the administra-
tor is guided, but also that regulation could be adopted pursuant to the
statute without affording minimal procedural safeguards. Because the
complexities of modem business enterprises demand informed, flexible
rule-making by specialized administrative agencies,' it is reasonable to
argue that specific guidelines should not be imposed on rule-makers by
statute. However, this is not to say that the rule-makers should operate
without safeguards. The constitutional integrity of the delegation authorized
by section 1155.18 should be protected by legislating procedural protections
into the rule-making process as already provided in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.'95
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
FIVE TYPES OF TIE-IN STATUTES
As can be seen from the analysis of Ohio and federal law on
constitutionality of the delegation of legislative authority, the courts have
upheld the delegation of authority if there are procedural safeguards.'
192 This statement was confirmed during a telephone conversation with Philip Cramer,
Executive Vice President of the Ohio League of Savings Associations.
193 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 111.15 (B) (Page 1978), as amended by Sub H.B. No. 257,
112th G.A. (1977-78) (eff. Jan. 1, 1978). See generally Inland Steel Development Corp.
v. Public Utilities Commission, 49 Ohio St. 2d 284, 361 N.E.2d 240 (1977) (dealing with
interim emergency orders).
194 This fact was recognized as early as 1940; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
'95 See Orno REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1978).
196 See generally Warren, The Notice Requirement in Administrative Rulemaking: An Anal-
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This final portion of the article will examine the general procedural
safeguards available in the five categories of tie-in statutes discussed earlier.
Based on the administrative procedure generally in force in the various states,
the type of statute and the constitutional analysis previously discussed, the
author will briefly analyze the constitutionality of the five classifications.
A. Automatic and Automatic with Post Limitations Statutes
On the state level, there are no real procedural safeguards built into
the completely automatic and the automatic with post limitations type
statutes. As discussed previously, these statutes result in the adoption of
federal power without the input of any state administrative agency or of the
state legislature, except, of course, legislative participation in the initial
tie-in statute. 9 The practical result of these two types of statutes is that
the state legislature is delegating its control of state savings associations to
the FHLBB. As FHLBB regulations are promulgated and become effective,
they are automatically made part of state law through the applicable
tie-in statutes. The only procedural safeguards available for the rules and
regulations adopted under this type of tie-in statute are at the federal level.
The FHLBB, in adopting regulations which define the powers of
federal savings associations, is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946 (APA)"9' Section 4 of the APA 9 sets forth the procedure for
adopting administrative rules. This section requires publication of a general
notice of the proposed rule in the federal register, stating:
(1) the time, place and nature of the proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority allowing for adoption of the rule; and
(3) the terms of the rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved.200
This would seem to give local savings associations and other interested
parties who deal with state associations and are affected by a proposed
rule sufficient notice of possible changes in the state savings association law
and a chance to influence these changes. However, there are exceptions to
the general rule-making procedures. Notice need not be given on interpretive
rules and where for good cause the notice is "impractical, unnecessary or
contrary to the public interest." ' The practical result is that these exceptions
undermine the rule and in many cases a notice or hearing on a proposed
19T See text accompanying notes 25-37 supra.
19s 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976).
199 Id. § 553.
20Id. § 553 (b).
20 Id. § 553 (A) & (B).
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rule is avoided. "2 As a result, states with completely automatic statutes and
automatic with post limitation statutes are expanding their local associations'
powers without any actual input from savings associations or other interested
parties into the rule-making procedure. The state chartered associations
themselves may have powers added or subtracted without procedural due
process.
Even if the FHLBB followed section 4 rule-making procedures, as a
practical matter a state association's effect on the rule-making procedure
of a federal agency seems highly speculative. The end result is federal
control of state chartered associations with few, if any, procedural due
process safeguards. The constitutionality of these two categories of statutes
is questionable. Because of the lack of procedural due process in adopting
regulations on the state level, a good argument could be made that the
state legislature has delegated too much power.
B. Prior Consent Statutes
Prior consent statutes do require at a minimum the approval of a
state administrator before additional powers are given to state chartered
associations. Of course, states with prior consent statutes are protected by
the federal administrative procedures as discussed in the proceeding para-
graphs. The real question in these states is whether the agency or administrator,
in giving his consent to the exercise of an increased federal power by a
state association, is subject to any administrative procedures on the state
level. The statutes of Hawaii and South Dakota will be used as examples
in this category.
In Hawaii, the prior consent tie-in statute requires the bank examiner
to consent to the exercise of federal powers by state associations."'3 The
issue is whether the bank examiner is subject to Hawaii's Administrative
Procedure Act °. when he gives this prior consent. Since the bank examiner
is expressly subject to the procedure act in Hawaii when he promulgates
rules and regulations,"'5 the narrower issue becomes whether the giving of
prior consent is a rule as defined in Hawaii's Administrative Procedure Act.
Rule is defined by the procedure act in pertinent part as: "each
agency's statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the
202 See Warren, supra note 196, for an excellent discussion of the notice requirements and
the distinction between legislative and interpretative rules.
203 HAw. REv. STAT. § 407-55 (1976).
24 Id. ch. 91.
265 Id. § 401-18.
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organization, procedure, or practice requirement of any agency. '"206 The
giving of prior consent would seem to fit into the definition of "rule" since
it is in essence a "statement of general or particular applicability" and it
"implements law," i.e., federal law on the state level. For this reason, the
bank examiner is forced to follow the procedure act when consenting to
the exercise of federal power by any state association.
Note further that the language of the Hawaii statute allows the
examiner to give a blanket grant of all federal powers to any savings
association meeting the criteria of the statute. As a result, the commissioner
is able to grant all future federal powers by promulgating one rule. In
essence, the end product of the statute could present the same problem as
in the completely automatic statute, i.e., as new federal powers are granted
to state associations there are no procedural safeguards protecting the local
associations or other interested parties. Thus, the same unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority and due process problem arises again. In
Hawaii, the problem could be remedied by the bank examiner only granting
federal powers to state associations on a rule-by-rule basis and while following
the local administrative procedure act. This method would solve the due
process problem and thus would substantially weaken any unconstitutional
delegation arguments.
The South Dakota prior consent statute requires the initial approval
of the savings and loan board before federal loan and investment powers
can be exercised by state chartered associations. 07 South Dakota, like
Hawaii, has a comprehensive administrative procedure act. Again the
problem revolves around whether or not the giving of prior approval is a
rule as defined in the South Dakota act.
"Rule" is in pertinent part defined by South Dakota's procedure act
as "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets,
or prescribes law, policy, procedure, or practice requirements of any
agency."" 8 Again, the approval in question would seem to implement law,
but there is one important difference in that the definition requires that the
statement be of general applicability, while the Hawaii statute covers only
statements of particular applicability. The tie-in statute in South Dakota
seems to contemplate the request and approval of federal powers to each
savings association on an individual basis. If granted individually, then the
approval would not have general applicability and would not be a rule as
defined in the statute. The result is that the savings and loan board could
easily sidestep the requirements of the procedure act in South Dakota.
206 Id. § 91-1 (4).
207 S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 52-8-24 (Supp. 1977).
208 Id. § 1-26-1 (7) (1974 & Supp. 1977).
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Another possible way to avoid the procedural requirement in both
Hawaii and South Dakota is to classify requests by savings associations as
requests for declaratory rules. Both the Hawaii... and the South Dakota21 °
definitions of rule exclude declaratory rules, which are edicts issued by an
agency to determine the applicability of any statutory provision or any rule
or order of the agency to the applicant.211 The result of such a classification
would thus enable the state agency to avoid the procedural safeguard for
"rules" provided in the administrative procedure acts.
In general, prior consent statutes are subject to at least one extra
administrative step in granting state associations federal powers. The problem
with this type of statute, as shown by the discussion of the South Dakota
and Hawaii statutes, is the doubtful applicability of the state administrative
procedure acts to this prior approval. In essence, without the administrative
safeguards, the statutes are open to attack on due process grounds.
C. One-At-A-Time Statutes
The fourth and largest category, i.e., the one-at-a-time statutes, generally
provides procedural safeguards for the adoption of federal powers. Nineteen" 2
of the states in this category have administrative procedure acts which apply
to the state agency responsible for the promulgation of parity regulations.
In Virginia, the State Corporation Commission is exempt from the Virginia
procedure act.1 but does have its own procedures to follow in promulgating
rules and regulations." ' Ohio also exempts the promulgation of parity
209 HAw. REV. STAT. § 91-1 (4) (1976).
.10 S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-7 (b) (1974).
211 HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-8 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-15 (1974).
212 AIx. STAT. ANN. ch. 7 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11371-11445
(West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1978); CoLo. REV. STAT. tit. 24, art. 4 (1973 & Cum. Supp.
1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, ch. 54 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
ch. 120 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 3A, ch. 3A-1 (1975 & Cum. Supp.
1977); IDAHO CODE tit. 67, ch. 52 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 2,
ch. 17A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, ch. 13 (1975 & Cure.
Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, ch. 13 (West Cum. Supp. 1977);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, 99 244-56 (1957 & Cum. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. tit. 82, ch. 42 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 to 150A-17 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, ch. 14B (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977-78);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, ch. 8 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977-78); OR. REV. STAT. tit.
18, ch. 183 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 42, ch. 35 (1977); S.C. CODE tit. 1, ch. 23,
art. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1977): W. VA. CODE ch. 29A, art. 3 (1976).
213 Agency is defined by the Virginia General Administrative Agencies Act to exclude
any agency given the powers of a court of record. VA. CODE § 9-6.14:4 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
The State Corporation Commission which regulates the state's savings associations is an
agency given the powers of a court of record by the Virginia Constitution. VA. CONST.
art. 9.
214 VA. CODE tit. 12, ch. 5 (1950 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
Maine is similar to Virginia in that it has a general administrative procedure act, but
the agency which regulates the savings industry is exempt from the general act and has
its own procedure. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-B, ch. 25 (West Pamplet 1977).
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regulations from the state Administrative Procedure Act.21 Missouri and
Mississippi have both procedure acts2"' and extra statutory procedures which
govern the procedure in adopting parity regulations. 2" The Kansas and
New Mexico statutes are not subject to those states' procedure acts"18 but
do have procedures for adopting parity regulations. 1 '
These states, with the possible exception of Ohio, meet the constitutional
requirements for procedural due process in the adoption of parity legislation.
Depending on the state and its law with regard to unconstitutionality delega-
tion of legislature authority, it appears that these statutes would be constitu-
tional.
D. Miscellaneous Statutes
Nebraska avoided all procedural due process arguments and delegation
problems by using a yearly enactment which grants all state savings
associations the powers already possessed by federal associations.2 ' Since
the legislature enacts the tie-in itself, there are no delegation problems and
since it is granting only powers already possessed by federal associations
and not future powers, there are no due process problems. Everyone
interested has the opportunity of input into the legislation as it is passed,
through his representative and by lobbying. For that reason, Nebraska's
statute appears to be the most constitutionally sound of all the tie-in statutes
discussed.
V. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of state tie-in statutes and their direct effects on
savings associations underscores the necessity of understanding the operation
of these statutes. Savings associations in forty-two states have powers equal
to the federal associations in the areas covered by their state tie-in statute.
As savings associations begin to exercise these new powers, other financial
institutions and consumers who are in some way affected will begin to
question the validity of the tie-in statutes and parity regulations. States
215 See text accompanying notes 182-83 supra.
216 Miss. CoDE ANN. tit. 25, ch. 43 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 36, ch. 536
(West 1953 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
21 Miss. CoDE ANN. § 81-12-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 81-12-7 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 369.299 (2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
218 KAN. STAT. § 17-5601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-15-94 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
219 KAN. STAT. § 17-5601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-15-115, 48-15-116
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
220 NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-355 (1977).
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which tie in federal law without the requisite procedural safeguards may
encounter serious constitutional due process and delegation problems. To
insure that these statutes and regulations will be upheld, not only in the
financial world, but also in other areas of law where a tie-in to federal law
would be advantageous, the various state legislatures should provide for
adequate procedures which would guarantee that all interested parties have
notice and an opportunity to be heard before the promulgation and adoption
of any federal powers on the state level.
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